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No.

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

CLAYTON JACKSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. DOES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ROOTED HOLDING OF *MCCORMICK V. UNITED STATES*, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), APPLY TO RICO AS WELL AS HOBBS ACT PROSECUTIONS, AS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HAS HELD, OR CAN A CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION BE CRIMINALLY PUNISHED AS A BRIBERY RICO PREDICATE ACT WITHOUT A FINDING IT WAS PART OF A QUID PRO QUO, AS THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULED BELOW?

II. IN A BRIBERY CASE IN WHICH A DEFENDANT WAS PRESSURED BY A POWERFUL ELECTED OFFICIAL ACTING AS AN UNDERCOVER INFORMANT TO LINK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND PENDING LEGISLATION IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS, BUT IN WHICH NO MONEY PASSED HANDS, IS IT PLAIN ERROR TO FAIL TO REQUIRE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAVE BEEN PREDISPOSED TO BRIBE BEFORE BEING SUBJECTED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S INDUCEMENTS?

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COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this matter was initially reported as *United States v. Jackson*, 61 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1995), and as amended is reported at 72 F.2d 1370.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner was convicted in the Eastern District of California of RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) offenses

and was sentenced to 76 months of imprisonment.[1] The Ninth Circuit, having had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirmed. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on December 15, 1995. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On December 1, 1993, Jackson was convicted in the Eastern District of California of conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, by using his Sacramento lobbying firm to commit (1) mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), (2) money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), and (3) bribery (California Penal Code § 85). The RICO Count alleged six predicate acts: Acts One through Five alleged violations of state bribery law; Act Six contained mail fraud and money laundering charges, all for the purpose of bribery.[2] Jackson also was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and eight counts of mail fraud (Counts Two through Ten), all duplicative of allegations contained in Act Six of the RICO charge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. INTRODUCTION

This is a case in which the government charged that petitioner Jackson, a prominent lobbyist for the insurance industry in California, and then state senator-turned-govern-

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[1]The District Court for the Eastern District of California proceeded pursuant to its jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

[2]The jury reported that it was hung on the first three of the five bribery allegations, but convicted on the RICO charge on the basis of Acts Four to Six.

ment-witness Alan Robbins were engaged in corrupt campaign contribution schemes between 1986 and 1991.

A corporate lawyer specializing in the representation of regulated industries, in the early 1970's Jackson began in earnest to use his legal expertise as a lobbyist. As several state legislators testified, petitioner's knowledge of the insurance industry and its critical role in the state's economy proved a crucial resource for state legislators who often had neither the time nor the inclination to become educated on insurance policy. Leading insurance industry figures relied heavily on Jackson to promote their views on pending legislation. Until this case, Jackson had never been accused of unethical or illegal activity in his profession.

As chair of the Senate Insurance Committee, Alan Robbins was one of California's most powerful lawmakers. The power of a legislative chair over those required to appear before him is readily apparent: to affect pending insurance legislation, one had to see Robbins. Alan Robbins was also corrupt. During the 1980's, he used his position to extort money from those required by the senator's power to discuss legislation with him, and ran a money laundering operation out of his legislative office.

In August 1988, the FBI for the first time confronted the senator. When it became clear the federal government was aware of illegal activities on his part (none of which involved Jackson), Robbins obstructed justice by directing his associates to destroy documents, to lie to the FBI, and to commit grand jury perjury. He paid others to lie and to destroy evidence. Robbins admitted lying to the FBI[3] and the grand jury prior to his decision to cooperate with the government. In June 1991, facing imminent indictment and a long prison term, Robbins agreed to plead guilty to racketeering charges

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[3]Lead FBI agent Wedick described Robbins as "one of the most evasive people" he had ever questioned.

and, as FBI agent James Wedick put it, to "work off his beef."

Rather than exposing the senator and forcing him out of office, the FBI turned Robbins into its highly-motivated secret agent, charged with the task — at the peril of having his bargain revoked — of generating evidence on high-level targets as to whom the FBI had no previous incriminating evidence. Robbins was told he would have to deliver a significant "catch" to reduce his sentence. According to Robbins, the government suggested Clay Jackson as a target. While Jackson's clients previously had given Robbins small and legally reported campaign contributions, the government had no evidence of prior wrongdoing on Jackson's part.

The plan was simple. The FBI instructed the senator, the powerful chair of a committee of critical importance to Jackson's clients, to demand money from petitioner repeatedly, conduct proscribed by law. A lenient sentence for Robbins was contingent on his willingness to do the government's bidding. The hope was Jackson would respond with a cash payment. After Robbins extorted him for large payoffs in taped conversations in the last half of 1991, Jackson discussed money with the powerful politician, but never gave him a nickel.

The focus of the entire case against Jackson was campaign contributions. As will now be demonstrated, the proper resolution of every allegation against Jackson required a correct understanding of the line separating bribery from constitutionally protected free speech, i.e., the difference between a campaign contribution exchanged for a specific official action and one made in the general hope of influencing a legislator's position on the issues before him.

B. THE ALLEGED OFFENSES

1. The Worker's Compensation Rate Bill (Act Five; Bribery)

Although it came last in time, Act Five — the "tape" charge — was the cornerstone of the government's case, as it was the only charge as to which the government offered corroboration of its sleazy key witness. Furthermore, as the district court noted at trial, the Act Five bribery charge, "even though one-sixth of Count One[,] probably constituted eighty percent of this trial."

The tapes of the 1991 meetings between Jackson and Robbins reveal Jackson lobbied Robbins, a key senator, on a bill of critical importance to an industry, on the basis of powerful and technical policy arguments. It was Robbins who first asked Jackson to "quantify" the issue's importance, and Jackson initially responded with lengthy policy reasoning. It was only after repeated urging by Robbins that Jackson suggested a large contribution figure.

Robbins asked Jackson to come up with a way to pass money outside his campaign committee, but it was the senator thereafter who suggested solutions of dubious legality, such as giving money outside his committee to his lawyer or a fictional person conjured up by the F.B.I. The point of these suggestions was to induce Jackson to *do* something illegal. Yet, despite the governments's continuation of the tape-recorded sting for months, Jackson never confirmed any past illegality with Robbins nor passed him money, consistent with his defense that he never bribed or had any intent to bribe Robbins, but rather mollified the senator with empty talk of mega-contributions to avoid his wrath. The Ninth Circuit agreed that, as to the charge supported by the tapes, "the jury could have concluded that Jackson lacked the intent to offer a bribe on this record." 72 F.3d at 1381.

2. The Carpenter Counts (RICO Act VI, Counts II-X; Mail Fraud, Money Laundering)

This group of counts alleged a past Robbins scheme to launder campaign contributions for bribery. According to Robbins, he and Jackson had agreed in 1986 that Robbins would receive contributions made by Jackson's clients to Paul Carpenter, then a state senator, later a member of the powerful Board of Equalization, which set state tax rates. Robbins testified he and Carpenter agreed to move funds from Carpenter to himself through the Goddard Company, a public relations firm. Jackson was not present at the Robbins-Carpenter conversation, and Robbins did not tell Jackson thereafter about the Goddard Company.

While there was ample evidence *Carpenter* had conferred and agreed with Robbins as to the illegal Goddard diversion, the only evidence Jackson knew anything of money going from Carpenter through Goddard to Robbins for his personal use came from Robbins, a conceded perjurer ready to lie for the benefits the government awarded him.[4] In his testimony, Jackson agreed he recommended that his clients make fully reported campaign contributions to Paul Carpenter between 1986 and 1989; Jackson asserted, however, that he then knew nothing of Robbins' illegal intentions in general or any arrangement between Carpenter and Robbins to launder money from the former to the latter through the Goddard Company.

Furthermore, even if Jackson knew Carpenter and Robbins had agreed to pass campaign contributions from the former to the latter, that fact in itself would suggest no illegality. The government has never disputed, and cannot, that a transfer of contributions between campaign committees of candidates from the same party is both legal and

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[4]Jennifer Goddard, a key player in the scheme and government witness, said she had never heard of Jackson.

common in California.[5] Thus to meet its burden on this count, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the government had to prove Jackson intended "to pass donations from insurance companies through Carpenter *and Goddard* to Robbins *as a bribe*." *Jackson*, 72 F.3d at 1382 (emphasis added).

A jury instructed as to the requirement of a quid pro quo for bribery and of the general legality of inter-candidate transfers could have believed much or all of Robbins' testimony and yet acquitted Jackson of mail fraud and laundering charges. A jury ignorant of the scope of the right to make political contributions and of the legitimacy of inter-candidate transfers, however, could have convicted Jackson solely because he made legitimate contributions to Carpenter in the hope or expectation of influencing either Carpenter, Robbins, or both.

3. The Marriott Contribution (RICO Act IV; Bribery)

In the spring of 1988 Jackson, on behalf of the Marriott Corporation, urged Robbins to vote against a bill; Robbins did so; the bill passed nonetheless; the Governor vetoed it; and months afterwards Robbins, along with a substantial number of other legislators, received a fully disclosed and legally reported $2,000 campaign contribution from the Marriott Corporation.

The only evidence Jackson even mentioned campaign contributions in lobbying came from Robbins. Even Robbins did not claim that Jackson in lobbying him promised a contribution of any particular amount, or that Robbins

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[5] *See Service Employees v. Fair Political Practices Commission*, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), *affirming* 721 F.Supp. 1172 (E.D.Cal. 1989) *and* 747 F.Supp. 580 (E.D.Cal. 1990) (intercandidate and intracandidate transfers of funds are protected by the First Amendment, validating the use of campaign committees to collect funds in the name of one person or entity to be given to another).

promised unconditional support to Jackson on the bill in question; according to Robbins, he rather had indicated to Jackson that he would support his clients where "politically feasible."

Thus a jury that understood contributing money to influence legislators is legal absent a "clear and unambiguous" quid pro quo could have believed Robbins' testimony and still easily acquitted for lack of an "explicit promise." Conversely, a jury that believed illegal any contribution made in the hope or expectation of legislative influence, while rejecting Robbins' testimony entirely, would convict Jackson simply because he tried to influence Robbins, albeit in a constitutionally protected manner.

C. THE INSTRUCTIONS

In instructing the jury on the elements of the bribery charges found in all predicate acts of the Count One RICO charge, the district court stated those offenses comprised giving or offering a bribe to any member of the California Legislature (Cal. Penal Code § 85), defining a bribe in the language of California Penal Code § 7(6) as

> anything of value or advantage, present or prospective, or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked, given, or accepted, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to whom it is given, in his action, vote, or opinion, in any public or official capacity.

"Corrupt[ly]" was defined — based on California Penal Code § 7(3) — as "a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage." The district court then instructed on a definition of "knowingly" found in the California Penal Code but never applied in that state's caselaw to the crime of bribery: "An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. *The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his acts or*

omissions were unlawful." The court thus defined bribery as a corrupt, wrongful or unlawful giving to a legislator with the intent to influence his action in his official capacity, which need not be known by the giver to be unlawful.

Jackson's counsel requested several instructions based on California and federal precedents defining legally permissible lobbying and campaign contributions,[6] and stating what distinguishes a legitimate campaign contribution from a bribe. These were refused.[7]

The district court defaulted on an initial promise to instruct on language requested by Jackson to the effect that "it must be clear that the payment was made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by an official to perform or not to perform an official act," and also refused the defense request to instruct that bribery requires a "quid pro quo." The jury was thus instructed that an attempt to influence a

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[6] *See* Jackson's Requested Instruction 2 (lobbying legal in California); Jackson's 3 (fact that lobbyist recommended to clients making campaign contributions with expectation of obtaining special influence and access or with generalized expectation of benefit, without more, not bribery); Jackson's 4 and 5 (campaign contribution cannot be bribe unless clear and unambiguous "quid pro quo" exists, in that "the payment must be made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act. . . ."); Jackson's 6 (soliciting political contributions protected by Constitution, and contributions can be unlimited under California law if properly reported); Jackson's 7 (lobbyists can recommend to clients that they make contributions to specific officials); Jackson's 8 (legal in California to receive contributions outside Capitol).

[7] Even though the bribery acts were state offenses defined by reference to the California Penal Code, the district court rejected proffered defense instructions based on California cases, saying that it did not want the jury "comparing" or "weighing California law versus federal law." As to the defense instructions based on federal decisional law, including opinions of this Court, the district court about-faced, refusing them on the ground that it would not read federal law principles into "California statutory bribery law."

legislator by a campaign contribution constituted bribery if unlawful, corrupt, or wrongful, but was not informed that attempts to influence could not be unlawful, corrupt, or wrongful unless part of a quid pro quo.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The opinion below conflicts with decisions of this Court, other circuits, and of the Ninth Circuit itself on a First Amendment issue at the core of our democratic political system. Whether as individuals or as part of interest groups, small or large, citizens have a constitutional right to seek to influence holders of and candidates for state office by financially supporting their political campaigns. Yet *Jackson* holds that such campaign contributions can be criminally punished as racketeering activity without a finding that they were given as part of a quid pro quo.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that to be convicted of a state bribery offense charged as a RICO predicate act, the maker of the political contribution need not know his act is unlawful, if he possesses no more than a "wrongful design." Any contribution made in the hope of influencing legislators in one direction can and often is considered dreadfully "wrongful" by those who hold a precisely contrary view of the merits of the law and politics in question. It is the requirement of an explicit quid pro quo, fashioned in the context of federal anti-corruption legislation, that allows a citizen or organization to engage in constitutionally protected financial support of controversial legislation or candidates without fear of criminal prosecution and conviction by prosecutors or juries hostile to the donor's political perspective. *McCormick v. United States*, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).

Although other circuits have reached a contrary result, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in *Jackson* rejected the applicability of *McCormick's* quid pro quo requirement to Califor-

nia's bribery statute by simply stating that "we decline to read such a requirement into First Amendment jurisprudence today." 72 F.3d at 1376. Sooner or later, this Court must resolve the inter-circuit conflict created by *Jackson*. It should do so now, so that all who support political candidates, be it through massive political action donations or five dollar direct mailing contributions, can understand the limit of their First Amendment rights and tailor their actions accordingly.

The Court should also decide an important issue arising from its decision in *Jacobson v. United States*, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). In this case, the key charge centered on discussions between a well-respected lobbyist and a powerful but corrupt state senator who had agreed with the FBI to set up the lobbyist to gain leniency on the charges facing the senator. The legislator-informant succeeded in taped conversations in inducing the lobbyist to link talk of political donations and of pending legislation, but failed to squeeze any payment whatsoever from his target; the pivotal accusation in the case thus implicated pure speech. Not only was the jury uninformed that a quid pro quo had to be located in such speech before it could serve as a basis for a bribery conviction, it was not instructed that a predisposition to bribe on the defendant's part had to precede the governmental inducements, as *Jacobson* requires. In a case in which a citizen faces imprisonment solely for speaking words the government went to great lengths to have him utter, an instruction on the *Jacobson* principle is critical to a fair verdict on guilt or innocence.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

I.

THE OPINION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH PRECEDENTS OF OTHER CIRCUITS APPLYING *McCORMICK'S* QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT TO STATE BRIBERY STATUTES, AND PERMITS THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONDUCT

McCormick rests upon a fundamental truth about the American electoral process — it runs to a great extent on money given to legislators and candidates in the hope of having influence on the recipients and on public policy.[8] When the money is given through lobbyists, some may feel a sense of distaste for the participants, particularly when the legislator and those seeking to exert influence are speaking privately and bluntly. Nonetheless, because giving money in the general hope of exerting influence is constitutionally protected, a state bribery statute must be interpreted so as not to punish such behavior.

To be punishable, the giving must be corrupt, in the sense that it is for a specific quid pro quo — thus setting the case apart from any general desire to influence. This quid pro quo requirement has two parts — first, there must be a bargain, and second, the parties must intend that there be a bargain. *See Evans v. United States*, 119 L.Ed 2d 57, 79 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[G]iven a corrupt motive, the quid pro quo . . . is the essence of the [Hobbs Act] offense.")

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[8] *See FEC v. National Conservative PAC*, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); *Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger*, 70 Cal.App.3d 878 (1977); *Service Employees v. Fair Political Practices Commission*, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), *affirming* 721 F.Supp. 1172 (E.D.Cal. 1989) *and* 747 F.Supp. 580 (E.D.Cal. 1990).

The opinion below rejects the first part of a quid pro quo requirement by refusing to obey *McCormick's* teaching,[9] placing the Ninth Circuit in conflict with other circuits. *Jackson* rejects the second part by reading out of the California bribery statute any specific intent requirement that lurks in its language, thereby making certain that the statute can reach speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment.

A. The Panel's Opinion Conflicts With Other Circuits' Application of *McCormick* To State Bribery Statutes.

In *McCormick*, a prosecution under the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), this Court considered the elements required to convict a state official of extortion upon the basis of his receipt of a campaign contribution. All members of the Court agreed that receipt of such a contribution could only violate the Act "if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act." 500 U.S. at 273.[10] *McCormick* did not locate this "quid pro quo" element in either the language or the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, but in the need to tailor its reach to avoid infringement of the historically established and constitutionally protected right of citizens to advance their viewpoints by financially sup-

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[9]The *Jackson* court reached the issue of whether a quid pro quo is constitutionally required after holding that "California bribery law does not require an explicit quid pro quo instruction . . ." 72 F.3d at 1378. The panel cited no California court decision to that effect, however, and none exists.

[10]While the vote to reverse McCormick's Hobbs Act conviction was not unanimous, the dissenters agreed that "it is essential that the payment in question be contingent on a mutual understanding that the motivation for the payment is the payer's desire to avoid a specific threatened harm or to obtain a promised benefit that the defendant has the apparent power to deliver. . . . In this sense, the crime does require a 'quid pro quo.'" 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

porting the campaigns of candidates sympathetic to those views.[11]

> Money is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant [in passing the Hobbs Act]. To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation.

500 U.S. at 272.

In this case, as in *McCormick*, the federal government has sought to punish as criminal the giving of campaign contributions to a state legislator. Whether a defendant is charged under RICO with violation of state bribery laws, or under the Hobbs Act, ought to be immaterial; it is irrational to conclude that the constitutional considerations limiting

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[11] "§ 1951 contains not even a colorable allusion to campaign contributions or quid pro quos." 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring); *see also Evans*, 119 L.Ed.2d at 84 (Thomas, dissenting): quid pro quo requirement of *McCormick* not located in "the common law or statutory text," but rather "imposed to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in American political life."

Hobbs Act prosecutions directed at a campaign contribution do not apply equally to RICO predicate charges directed at the same contribution.[12]

For that reason, other federal courts that have dealt with the applicability of *McCormick* to state bribery statutes have held or stated that the criminalization of campaign contributions requires a constitutionally conditioned element of a quid pro quo. *United States v. Martinez*, 14 F.3d 543, 553 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (because the substance of the subpredicate acts involving bribery under Florida law is essentially the same as extortion under the Hobbs Act, *McCormick* applies, and failure to instruct on quid pro quo requires reversal of RICO predicate convictions under state bribery law); *United States v. Allen*, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting applicability of quid pro quo to state bribery statutes, court states: "Given the minimal difference between extortion under color of right and bribery, it would seem that courts should exercise the same restraint in interpreting bribery statutes as the *McCormick* Court did in interpreting the Hobbs Act: absent some fairly explicit language otherwise, accepting a campaign contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made in exchange for an explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act."); *see also United States v. Arthur*, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976), citing *United States v. Brewster*, 506 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (district court's failure to require quid pro quo as element of bribery permitted jury to convict bank official of misapplication of bank funds on

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[12]That is particularly so because RICO penalties equal or exceed those contained in the Hobbs Act. "Congress has drawn a distinction between varying degrees of official corruption and has chosen the quid pro quo requirement to separate those crimes warranting severe sanctions from those justifying a lighter punishment." Hager, "The Hobbs Act: Maintaining The Distinction Between A Bribe And A Gift", 83 Kent. L.J. 197 (1994-95).

basis of legitimate "goodwill" expenditures to public officials, requiring reversal).

The *Jackson* opinion states that "the First Amendment does not imply an explicit quid pro quo element into every state bribery case"; it cites no case that so holds, nor does it offer any reason why *McCormick* should not be so read, at least where campaign contributions are at issue. The Court should decide this issue of great political importance in the same manner as the Eleventh Circuit has.

B. By Eliminating Any Element Of Knowledge Of Illegality From The Bribery Statute, And By Defining A "Corrupt Intent" Circularly As "Wrongful Design," The *Jackson* Opinion Permits A Campaign Contributor To Be Convicted Of Bribery For The Constitutionally Protected Act Of Attempting To Influence A Legislator.

Jackson argued his conviction for bribery required a jury finding that he knew the campaign contributions he arranged were illegal. Such a mental state element might well eliminate the problem of overbreadth otherwise posed by the California bribery statute. The panel rejected the claim, however, asserting that under the 1910 California Supreme Court decision in *People v. Glass*, 158 Cal. 650, "section 85 requires an intent to influence corruptly only." 72 F.3d at 1377.[13]

The panel then rejected Jackson's claim under *United States v. Dorri*, 15 F.3d 888, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1994), that the term "corrupt" was defined tautologically as "unlawful," and thus was meaningless. The circuit held that "corruptly"

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[13] In 1910, not only had *McCormick* not been decided, but this Court had yet to apply the First Amendment to the states. *See Gitlow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

was also defined as a "wrongful design." "On these instructions, then, there is no circularity." 72 F.3d at 1377.

To define "corrupt" as "wrongful" is as circular as to define it as "unlawful." Unlike "explicit promise," these three terms are adjectives without defined content, leaving juries and prosecutors free to punish contributions and contributors that support disfavored causes and candidates. A statute that punishes all attempts to influence legislators "wrongfully" is unconstitutional, unless, contrary to the circuit's view, a quid pro quo requirement is read into "corruptly" or "wrongfully."[14] It is no answer to this problem to assert that the California bribery statute was defined at Jackson's trial as it was eighty five years ago, when state law was not constrained by the First Amendment or *McCormick*.

Furthermore, by refusing Jackson's various instructions as to what is indisputably legal political activity in California — lobbying; recommending campaign contributions to specific legislators with the expectation of obtaining special influence and access or with generalized expectation of benefit; soliciting unlimited campaign contributions; and receiving political contributions outside the Capitol — the district court failed to distinguish bribery from legal forms of political activity "with sufficient clarity to enable the jury to determine the legality of appellant's activities. *Arthur*, 544 F.2d at 735. That "error is not harmless because it created a

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[14] At another point in its opinion, the panel apparently senses this danger, stating that the California bribery statute criminalizes "the sort of implicit quid pro quo that is the essence of bribery . . . ." 72 F.3d at 1380. The jury, however, was given no instruction that required it to find any kind of quid pro quo, explicit or implicit. If there is indeed an "implicit quid pro quo" element in the statute, Jackson's convictions must be reversed due to the failure to submit that element to the jury. *United States v. Gaudin*, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995); *United States v. Gaudin*, 28 F.3d 943 (1994).

reasonable possibility that [petitioner] was convicted for activity that is not a crime." *United States v. Carpenter*, 961 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing Hobbs Act convictions for failure to instruct on quid pro quo requirement). The danger to the First Amendment posed by the rulings below more than justify a grant of certiorari.

II.

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES POSED ABOVE, THE FAILURE OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEACHINGS OF *JACOBSON* MERITS THIS COURT'S REVIEW

Jackson was tried and convicted on the central charge in this case — RICO Act Five — not because he gave a politician money for his vote, but because he acceded to a powerful legislator's pressure in their discussions to link a large campaign contribution to pending legislation. After expressly acknowledging the evidence that Jackson had been entrapped into holding such discussions required instruction on that defense, the district court gave the following charge: "A person is entrapped when the person has no previous intention to violate the law and is persuaded to commit a crime by government agents." "On the other hand, where a person is already willing to commit a crime, it is not entrapment if the government agents merely provide an opportunity to commit the crime."

Missing from the instruction was the critical language of *Jacobson v. United States*, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), requiring the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's predisposition to criminality *prior to contact by government agents*; present is the term "already" which has been condemned as inconsistent with *Jacobson*. *See United States v. Mkhsian*, 5 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993).

The panel below agreed the trial judge committed instructional error; yet it deemed the error harmless because "there was extremely strong evidence that Jackson engaged in bribery and money laundering schemes prior to the time Robbins began to act as a government agent." 72 F.3d at 1378.[15]

In fact, since eighty percent of the evidence in the case involved Act Five, it is highly probable the jury focused its deliberations on that charge and, having found pursuant to the erroneous entrapment instructions that Jackson bribed Robbins there, used that finding to convict on the other charges, all of which were based on uncorroborated allegations. The entrapment instructional error on Act Five, rather than being cured by the other convictions, tainted the entire judgment.

Clay Jackson and his clients were forced by Robbins' position to talk legislation with him. Robbins' power likewise required that those who lobbied him try to appease him during those discussions, leaving them vulnerable to his efforts to draw them into legally dangerous waters. In such a context, it is simply wrong to hold that a jury can accurately decide the issue of guilt and innocence without reference to the *Jacobson* principle, particularly in the face of such

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[15]This "extremely strong evidence" language was used in the Ninth Circuit's original opinion, in which the panel grossly misread the evidentiary record, stating the taped conversations between Robbins and Jackson happened in 1986, before Jackson's clients contributed money to Carpenter and Robbins. *See United States v. Jackson*, 61 F.3d 1386, *amended by*, 72 F.3d 1370. Such a chronology would indeed have been damning, but in fact Jackson passed no money to Robbins after the senator extorted him on tape in 1991. Although correcting the blatant factual errors in its initial opinion on rehearing, the panel's amended decision retained the language overstating the strength of the government's case.

substantial incentives given by the government to its only witness.[16]

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should grant certiorari in this matter to involve two important issues of law.

Dated: March 14, 1996

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys For Petitioner
Clayton R. Jackson

[16] As a reward for serving as its witness prior to Jackson's trial, the federal government had Robbins' sentence cut to two years, and agreed not to pursue asset forfeiture or civil RICO claims which would have resulted in his personal bankruptcy, choosing instead to leave Robbins with a multi-million dollar fortune.

APPENDIX A

No. 94-10095

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLAYTON R. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Argued and Submitted April 12, 1995.

Decided July 25, 1995.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and
Rehearing en Banc December 15, 1995.*

Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Edward J. Garcia, J., of racketeering, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and money laundering, and mail fraud in connection with offering of bribes to state senator. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Goodwin, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) California bribery statute does not require explicit quid pro quo; (2) bribery statute did not require that defendant intend to break the law; (3) entrapment instruction was proper; (4) court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's proposed instructions; (5) evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions; and (6) court was not required to give unanimity instructions.

Affirmed.

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* Judge Hug voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc and Judges Gibson and Goodwin so recommended.

Hug, Circuit Judge, voted to reject suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Gibson and Goodwin, Circuit Judges, recommended rejection of suggestion for rehearing en banc.

1. Criminal Law — 1134(3)

Issue of whether quid pro quo element is required for bribery conviction was one of law for purposes of determining standard of review.

2. Criminal Law — 1038.2, 1043(1)

Even absent formal objection to rejection of defendant's proposed instruction, defendant adequately preserved for appeal claim that bribery statute required quid pro quo element where he argued his quid pro quo point throughout and offered alternative instruction.

3. Bribery — 1(1)

Constitutional Law — 91

First Amendment does not imply explicit quid pro quo element into every state bribery offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

4. Bribery — 14

California law does not require explicit quid pro quo instruction in prosecution for bribery. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 85.

5. Criminal Law — 1139

Whether state bribery statute requires defendant to know that his acts were unlawful is question of law subject to de novo review.

6. Criminal Law — 1038.1(4)

Where defendant did not object to instructions on knowledge, wording of instructions as contradictory or circular would be reviewed for plain error only.

7. Bribery — 1(1)

For purposes of interpreting California bribery statutes, "unlawfully" means same thing as corruptly, and defendant need not intend to break law to violate statute. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 85.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

8. Bribery — 14

There was no circularity in bribery instructions which defined "unlawfully" as "corruptly" and defined "corruptly" as "wrongful design."

9. Criminal Law — 772(6)

Instruction that there is no entrapment if government agents merely provide opportunity to commit the crime to person who was already willing to commit the crime was defective due to ambiguity of the word "already," the impression of which permits jury to convict without showing by government that defendant was disposed to commit crime prior to contact with government agents.

10. Criminal Law — 1038.1(4)

Defect in entrapment instruction would be reviewed for plain error, even though defendant failed to object.

11. Criminal Law — 1038.1(4)

Giving of entrapment instruction which referred to person who was "already" willing to commit crime was not plain

error in racketeering prosecution in view of fact that jury found defendant guilty of offenses similar to predicate offenses which occurred prior to predicate offenses.

12. Criminal Law — 1038.1(4)

Where evidence virtually compels finding that defendant was predisposed, so that jury would have found him predisposed in any event, no plain error exists in entrapment instruction which refers to person who is "already" willing to commit a crime.

13. Criminal Law — 1139, 1152(1)

Whether district court's rejection of defendant's proposed instruction is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion is undetermined in the Ninth Circuit.

14. Criminal Law — 829(1)

Court is not required to give instruction on point already adequately covered by another instruction.

15. Criminal Law — 829(3)

Where court gave adequate instruction defining elements of bribery and gave two instructions contrasting bribery with legal lobbying activity, it was not error to decline defendant's requested instructions on other indisputably legal activity which was not in issue.

16. Criminal Law — 811(4), 829(4)

Court did not err in rejecting defendant's proposed instructions which would have repeated specifics of his theories, running risk of biasing instructions in favor of defendant, where instructions actually given adequately covered law on both defendant's entrapment and extortion theories.

17. Criminal Law — 829(3)

Where defendant's theory turns on lack of intent, jury instructions that adequately reflect intent required for offense obviate need for specific instructions on innocent states of mind.

18. Criminal Law — 1139

Sufficiency of indictment is reviewed de novo.

19. Indictment and Information — 60, 110(3)

Indictment is insufficient if it does not contain necessary elements of crime alleged, but indictment that tracks words of statute violated is generally sufficient, so long as implied, necessary elements not present in statutory language are included.

20. Indictment and Information — 110(3)

Where statutory language and instructions adequately stated elements required for offense, and indictment incorporated relevant statute, indictment was sufficient.

21. Criminal Law — 552(1)

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain conviction.

22. Criminal Law — 1044.2(2)

Even though defendant did not renew motion for acquittal at close of case, sufficiency of evidence was not limited to plain error review where court did not rule on acquittal motion until after jury returned its verdicts.

23. Bribery — 1(1)

Whether bribe was actually delivered is irrelevant to issue of whether bribe was offered in violation of California law. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 85.

24. Criminal Law — 446

Defendant's racketeering conviction based on offering of bribe in violation of state law was supported by tape recording of conversations between defendant, a lobbyist, and state senator. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c); West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 85.

25. Postal Service — 48 (4.4)

Indictment which alleged that, as part of scheme to defraud and obtain money by means of false pretenses, defendant induced unsuspecting lobbying clients to make campaign contributions to official's campaign committee when defendant knew that substantial portion of contributions were not for benefit of that official but would be directed to benefit of another official adequately encompassed, as part of defendant's mail fraud, the misrepresentation of political status of official for whose campaign committee the money was ostensibly solicited.

26. Indictment and Information — 117

Indictments should not be read so narrowly that they must explicitly include every particular argument or bit of evidence that prosecutor may offer at trial.

27. Criminal Law — 798(.5)

There was no need for unanimity instructions with respect to mail fraud charges where only one scheme was presented to jury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

28. Criminal Law — 1173.3

Any possible prejudice to defendant due to lack of unanimity instruction with respect to mailings which formed predicates for racketeering convictions was removed by fact that defendant was convicted of mail fraud with respect to same mailings, thus showing that jurors unanimously agreed on mailings.

29. Criminal Law — 772(1), 1173.2(2)

Court's failure to orally instruct jury on elements of charged offenses cannot be cured by making written indictment available to jury.

30. Criminal Law — 822(1)

Lack of emphasis of particular theory presented by defense did not render instructions as a whole improper.

31. Postal Service — 35(5)

Jurors could infer defendant's knowledge that official would mail campaign reports to Secretary of State in pursuance of bribery scheme from fact that whole aim of arrangement was to get bribe money through that official to another official and that, in order for scheme to work, first official would have to falsify campaign reports to account for money. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

32. United States — 34

Crime of money laundering in connection with bribery of state official did not require jury to find that defendant knew that money funneled to state official would be used for his personal use. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.

33. Bribery — 1(2)
Postal Service — 35(5)

Neither crime of mail fraud nor bribery required finding that defendant knew that state senator to whom he was making payments would put proceeds to personal use. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 85.

34. Criminal Law — 872.5

To convict defendant of money laundering, all jurors had to agree that defendant was culpable for same particular act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.

35. Criminal Law — 1038.2

Any error in lack of unanimity instruction with respect to which acts constituted money laundering was not plain error where each of specific transactions charged documented same part of money laundering scheme and, if defendant was culpable for one check, he would be culpable for all of them. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.

36. United States — 34

In order for defendant to be convicted of money laundering on basis of bribing of state official, it was not necessary that defendant know of role of one participant in scheme so long as it was shown that he initiated, concluded, or participated in initiation or conclusion of transaction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.

37. Criminal Law — 59(5)

It is not necessary for aider and abettor to know who actually committed crime.

Dennis P. Riordan, Riordan & Rosenthal, San Francisco, California and Michael Tigar, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas, for defendant-appellant.

John K. Vincent, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, California, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before: FLOYD R. GIBSON**, GOODWIN, and HUG, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

Clayton Jackson was convicted of racketeering (18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)), conspiracy to commit mail fraud and money laundering (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956 and 1341), and mail fraud (18 U.S.C.A. § 1341) for his part in offering bribes to California state Senator Alan Robbins and establishing a money laundering scheme to funnel the money fraudulently obtained from Jackson's clients to Robbins through California state Senator Paul Carpenter. He appeals.

Jackson's primary contention is that existing caselaw requires the jury to find an explicit quid pro quo to convict Jackson of the racketeering charges predicated on violation of a California bribery statute. The appeal also asserts instructional errors and evidentiary shortcomings, none of which justifies reversal. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Clayton Jackson, a prominent lobbyist for the insurance industry, was indicted in a sweeping federal investigation of corruption in Sacramento. Senator Alan Robbins, who was convicted on similar charges, was the Chairman of the

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** The Honorable Floyd R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Senate Insurance Committee. The following summaries set out the facts underlying each of Jackson's convictions.

A. *Racketeering Act 4 — Senate Bill 1719*

In Racketeering Act 4, the indictment charged Jackson with offering a bribe to Robbins in the form of campaign contributions in exchange for Robbins' assistance in defeating Senate Bill 1719 in early 1988. The governor vetoed the bill after both houses had passed it. Robbins then sent Jackson a letter and newspaper articles chronicling Robbins' action against SB 1719. Shortly thereafter, Jackson's client, who would have been adversely affected by the passage of SB 1719, donated $2,000 to Robbins.

B. *Racketeering Act 5 — Workers' Compensation*

During the course of tape-recorded conversations, Jackson offered Robbins a $250,000 bribe. (Unknown to Jackson, Robbins had already been caught and had agreed to wear a wire in consideration for a reduced sentence.) Jackson promised this substantial reward if Robbins could bring under the jurisdiction of Robbins' friendly insurance committee an upcoming workers' compensation measure that would abolish the minimum rate law. Over a period of months, Jackson and Robbins discussed the outlines of the deal. Jackson promised to raise the money from the small insurance companies he represented, and who would be wiped out if the workers' compensation minimum rate law were abolished. Jackson solicited donations from several insurance executives, telling them that the money would be used to establish a coalition of similar companies backed by a political action committee.

C. *Racketeering Act 6 and Counts II through X — Mail Fraud and Money Laundering*

Jackson and Robbins sought to avoid the reporting requirements attached to campaign funds. They enlisted the

aid of former senator Paul Carpenter, then serving on the Board of Equalization. Carpenter offered to let Jackson's clients contribute to his campaign committee and then have his campaign committee make payments at Robbins' direction.

Jackson, Robbins, and Carpenter worked out a scheme whereby Jackson had his clients contribute to Carpenter, who, as a member of the Board of Equalization, was relatively immune from criticism for accepting large donations from insurance companies. Carpenter, after taking his cut, would then write checks and mail them to the Goddard Company, ostensibly as compensation for public relations work performed by the Goddard Company. In fact, Jennifer Goddard of the Goddard Co. was a friend of Robbins, did no work for Carpenter, and would merely issue a false invoice to Carpenter in return for the payments. Carpenter carried the lie to the California Secretary of State, mailing mandatory reports characterizing these expenditures of campaign funds as payments for professional services. After taking her cut, Jennifer Goddard would either pass the money on to Robbins directly or spend it on Robbins' personal expenses as he directed.

In all, Carpenter received over $84,000 in contributions from Jackson's clients, at Jackson's request, and passed $78,500 to Goddard, Robbins' front. Checks mailed from Jackson's clients to Carpenter and the false campaign reports mailed from Carpenter to the Secretary of State supported the jury verdict which convicted Jackson of the mail fraud related offenses. The deposit of checks paid by Carpenter to the Goddard Co. supported the verdict which convicted Jackson of racketeering predicated on money laundering.

II. THE BRIBERY-RELATED OFFENSES

A. *The Requirement of a "Quid Pro Quo" Under the California Bribery Statute*

Jackson argues that the predicate state bribery offenses charged in Racketeering Act 4 and Act 5 of Count I, the RICO count, require a showing of an explicit agreement to exchange money for a political favor, a quid pro quo, and the district court's failure to so instruct the jury constitutes reversible error.

1. *Instructions*

Predicate Acts 4 and 5 of the RICO count in the indictment charge Jackson with offering bribes as defined in California Penal Code § 7(6), in violation of California Penal Code § 85.[1]

The district court instructed the jury on bribery, in relevant part, as follows:

No. 27

In order to prove such crime [bribery], each of the following elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The defendant gave or offered a bribe;

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[1] California Penal Code § 7(6) provides:

> The word "bribe" signifies anything of value or advantage, present or prospective, or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked, given or accepted, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to whom it is given in his or her action, vote, or opinion, in any public or official capacity.

California Penal Code § 85 provides:

> Every person who gives or offers to give a briber to any Member of the Legislature, or to another person for him, or attempts by menace, deceit, suppression of truth, or any corrupt means to influence a member in giving or withholding his vote . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four years.

3. The defendant gave or offered such bribe with the specific intent corruptly to influence the other person in his official capacity as to some act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceeding;

No. 28

A "bribe" is anything of value or advantage, present or prospective, or any promise to give any such thing asked, given or accepted, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to whom it is given in his action, vote, or opinion, in any public or official capacity.

No. 29

The work "corruptly" imports a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person.

No. 31

To constitute the crime of offering a bribe, it is not necessary that any particular words or conduct be used, provided that the means of communication used, viewed in the light of the attending circumstances, is such as to clearly show that a bribe is being offered. . . .[2]

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[2]The operative language of instruction No. 27 is taken from the standard California jury instruction on bribery offenses that parallel § 85. *See,* CALJIC (5th ed.) 7.00 (bribery of an executive officer) and 7.01 (bribery of a ministerial official). All the operative language of No. 28 likewise comes from the definition given in § 7(6). *See,* text of § 7(6) at footnote 1, *supra.* Instruction No. 29 is taken verbatim from CalPenal Code § 7(3) and CALJIC 7.00.5. Finally, instruction No. 31 matches CALJIC 7.07.

The district court's instructions also comport closely with the common understanding of a "bribe" as "a price, reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct

2. *Standard of Review*

[1] "Whether a jury instruction misstates elements of a statutory crime is a question of law and is reviewed *de novo*." *U.S. v. Johnson*, 956 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir.1992). There is a great deal of argument in the briefs over whether the plain error or abuse of discretion standard should apply here. Because the issue is whether *McCormick* implies a quid pro quo element into a § 85 offense, the question is one of law, not merely of the wording of the instructions.

[2] The government claims that Jackson failed to preserve the issue with a proper objection and therefore the plain error standard applies. Even absent a formal objection after the rejection of his proposed instruction, Jackson adequately preserved the issue. He argued his quid pro quo point throughout, offered an alternative instruction, and it is clear from the record the court knew of his objection. *See U.S. v. Kessi*, 868 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir.1989) (establishing test to determine whether an issue was adequately preserved absent a formal objection).

3. *Discussion*

The heart of the debate is whether the Supreme Court, in *McCormick v. U.S.*, 500 U.S. 257, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991), mandates reading a quid pro quo requirement into California's bribery laws. At the jury instructions conference and now in his brief, Jackson argued that the holding of *McCormick* applies to the California bribery charges, requiring the jury to find an explicit promise or agreement between Sen. Robbins and Jackson to exchange money for the performance of an official act.

In *McCormick*, the Supreme Court interpreted the Hobbs Act, which prohibits extortion under color of official right,

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especially of a person in a position of trust (as a public official)." *Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary* (1986).

and held that a Hobbs Act violation can be found only "if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act." *McCormick*, *Id.* at 273, 111 S.Ct. at 1816.

In support of his assertion that *McCormick* applies to the California bribery statute, Jackson relies on *U.S. v. Freeman*, 6 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.1993). He argues that *Freeman* interpreted the *McCormick* quid pro quo requirement as a constitutional limitation on criminalizing campaign contributions. In *Freeman*, the appellant challenged on First Amendment grounds Cal.Penal Code § 68, which makes it a crime for state employees to ask, receive, or agree to receive a bribe. This Court upheld the constitutionality of § 68, saying that "[a]lthough the defendant state representative in *McCormick* was charged with violating the Hobbs Act rather the RICO [with a predicate violation of § 68], the Supreme Court's decision in that case controls this question." *Id.* at 597.

The district court rejected Jackson's argument that without the requirement of a quid pro quo, the jury may have convicted him for exercising his protected speech in ways that, though offensive to lay persons not calloused by years of political traffic, cannot be constitutionally prescribed. The district court reasoned that *U.S. v. Montoya,* 945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir.1991), limited the *McCormick* decision to the federal extortion statute under review in that case, and specifically ruled that *McCormick* has no impact on California bribery law. The government on appeal contends that the district court was correct, that *Montoya* has already resolved the issue in its favor, and we agree.

Montoya reversed the appellant's Hobbs Act convictions because the jury instructions failed to require a finding of an explicit quid pro quo as mandated by *McCormick*. The appellant then argued that his erroneous Hobbs Act convictions required reversal of his money laundering convictions

predicated on California bribery violations (Cal.Penal Code § 86). We rejected that argument, holding that:

> In defining an essential element of the crime of extortion under color of official right the Supreme Court was interpreting a federal crime under the Hobbs Act. This requirement would have no bearing on the construction of the California bribery statute alleged as the predicate "specified unlawful activity" under Count IV.

Id. at 1075. *Montoya* made clear that *McCormick* was a case of statutory construction. The question whether California bribery law required proof of quid pro quo for statutory reasons or for first amendment reasons was not before us then and was not decided. Those questions remained open two years later when we decided *Freeman*.

[3,4] In *Freeman*, the appellant argued that the RICO statute was unconstitutional as applied in that case "because it chills the exercise of First Amendment rights, namely solicitation of campaign funds." *Id.* at 597. Relying on *McCormick*, we rejected the as applied challenge. Unlike the jury in *McCormick*, the jury in *Freeman* was instructed to find quid pro quo. *Id.* at 594. *Freeman* cited *McCormick* for the proposition that the First Amendment does not protect political contributions made in return for an explicit promise by the official to perform an official act. *Freeman* did not hold the converse, that a failure to require proof of a quid pro quo would violate the First Amendment, and we decline to read such a requirement into First Amendment jurisprudence today. Because the First Amendment does not imply an explicit quid pro quo element into every state bribery offense, and California bribery law does not require an explicit quid pro quo instruction, the absence of one here cannot constitute error.

B. *The Knowledge Instructions was Proper*

The district court defined "knowledge" for the jury in Instruction 30, in relevant part, as follows:

> An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his acts or omissions were unlawful.

This definition closely tracks the definition offered in the Penal Code and the standard jury instructions. *See*, Cal.Penal Code § 7(5) and CALJIC 1.21.

Jackson contends that a § 85 violation requires that the defendant intend to violate a known legal duty. If this is the case, Jackson argues, then the knowledge instruction which specifically states that the defendant need not know the law to be convicted contradicts the instructions defining the elements of a § 85 offense. Jackson further argues that the reconciliation of the two instructions offered by California law and argued by the prosecution renders the definition of a bribery offense hopelessly circular.

1. *Standards of Review*

[5, 6] Whether § 85 requires the defendant to know that his acts were unlawful is a question of law subject to *de novo* review. *U.S. v. Johnson*, 956 F.2d at 199. Because Jackson did not object to the knowledge instruction at trial, this Court reviews the wording of the instructions for contradiction or circularity for plain error only. *U.S. v. Fagon*, 996 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1993).

2. *Knowledge of Illegality Not Required Under Cal.Penal Code § 85*

Because the definition of "bribe" requires a "corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully", Jackson argues that the

defendant must specifically intend to act unlawfully, that is, he must know that his acts are illegal. Given this statutory language, Jackson would have a stronger argument had the California Supreme Court not already foreclosed it. In *People v. Glass*, 158 Cal. 650, 112 P. 281 (1910), the California Supreme Court effectively read the word "unlawfully" out of the bribery statute.[3] In that case, the California Supreme Court held:

> The use of the word "unlawfully" as qualifying "to influence" in subdivision 6 of section 7, adds nothing to the meaning of section 165 . . . There can be no intent to corruptly influence an officer in his official capacity, by giving to him money, that is not an intent to unlawfully influence such officer in such action.

People v. Glass, 158 Cal. at 676, 112 P. 281.

[7] In short, "unlawfully", for purposes of interpreting California bribery statutes, means the same thing as "corruptly"; thus, § 85 requires an intent to influence corruptly only. Contrary to Jackson's argument, a defendant need not intend to break the law to violate § 85. Accordingly, the knowledge instruction did not misstate the elements of § 85 and did not contradict the instructions on the intent required for a § 85 violation.[4]

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[3] In *Glass,* Cal.Penal Code § 165, which prohibits offering or giving bribes to county supervisors, was the subject of review. However, the language of § 165 parallels that of § 85, leaving little doubt that any ruling on the meaning of one section applies to the other. Moreover, the court in *Glass* interpreted the definition of bribe in § 7(6), which is directly at issue in this case.

[4] Jackson also argues that "clear import of recent Supreme Court law is that the defendant in a bribery case must specifically intend to violate a known legal duty." However, the Supreme Court cases Jackson cites for this proposition could have no such import on any plausible reading. In *Ratzlaf v. U.S.*, the Court interpreted statutory language conditioning criminality on "willfully violating" particular code sections. The Court

3. *The Instructions Were Not Circular*

Jackson argues that this interpretation of bribery mandated by the California Supreme Court renders the instructions given hopelessly circular. If "unlawfully" here means the same thing as "corruptly", and the instructions define "corruptly" as meaning "unlawful", the argument runs, the instructions are circular and provide no real guidance to a jury. *See, U.S. v. Dorri*, 15 F.3d 888, 894–95 (9th Cir.1994) (Judge Kozinski dissenting) (discussing the circularity of these instructions and their likelihood to confuse a jury).

Whatever may be the merits of this argument, it has not application to the instructions here.

In this case unlike *U.S. v. Dorri* which Jackson cites, "corruptly" was not defined as "unlawfully", but as "a wrongful design". On these instructions, then, there is no circularity. "Unlawfully" was defined by law as "corruptly" which was defined as a "wrongful design".[5]

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read this language as requiring the defendant to know that he was violating the law. __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 655, 658, 126 L.Fd.2d 615 (1994). The Court in *Ratzlaf* defined the intent requirement of a federal statute prohibiting structuring financial transactions to avoid certain reporting requirements. How the interpretation of this federal statute impacts interpretive issues in California bribery statutes, particularly where those issues have already been settled by the California Supreme Court, is unclear. The relevance of *Staples v. U.S.*, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), is even more remote. The issue in *Staples* was whether a federal statute requiring the registration of certain firearms had any mental state element at all. The Court ultimately ruled that there was a presumed knowledge element, but did not in any way impute that a defendant had to know his acts were illegal to violate the provision.

[5]Most civilizations have understood the wrongfulness of bribery. Judge Noonan has traced the origins of this understanding in the West back to the prophet Ezekiel. *See* John T. Noonan, *Bribes* (1984). In our political culture, bribery ranks with treason as one of the only two crimes

[8] Taken as a whole, the instruction given did not misstate the intent required under § 85, did not contradict the other intent instructions, and did not render the instructions hopelessly circular.

C. *The Entrapment Instruction Was Proper*

At trial, Jackson contended that the government entrapped him into offering the $250,000 bribe charged in Racketeering Act 5. The district court instructed the jury almost verbatim from the Ninth Circuit pattern instruction:

> A person is entrapped when the person has no previous intention to violate the law and is persuaded to commit a crime by government agents.
>
> On the other hand, where a person is already willing to commit a crime, it is not entrapment if government agents merely provide an opportunity to commit the crime.

Jackson now argues that this instruction misstates the law, warranting reversal.

[9] There is no question that the instruction given was imperfect. In *U.S. v. Mkhsian*, 5 F3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.1993), we held that an entrapment instruction virtually identical to the one given here was defective due to the ambiguity of the word "already". The imprecision of the term "already" permits a jury to convict without a showing by the government that the defendant was disposed to commit the crime prior to contact with government agents, as required by *Jacobson v., U.S.*, 503 U.S. 540.112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed2d 174 (1992).

[10] The consequence of the "already" error is a disputed matter. The government argues that Jackson invited

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specifically mentioned in the Constitution. *See* U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Section 4.

this error, by proposing a similar instruction suffering from the same defect, and then by failing to raise the *Mkhsian* objection to the instruction given. Though the logic of the government's position is sound, in *U.S. v. Lessard*, 17 F.3d 303, 305-6 (9th Cir.1994), we subjected an entrapment instruction with the same defect to plain error review, even though the defendant failed to object. Accordingly, we review the *Mkhsian* error here for plain error.

[11, 12] The faulty entrapment instruction does not rise to the level of plain error in this case. Where the evidence virtually compels a finding that the defendant was predisposed, so that the jury would have found the defendant predisposed under *Jacobson* in any event, no plain error exists. *U.S. v. Davis*, 36 F.3d 1424, 1432 (9th Cir.1994). In the present case, there was extremely strong evidence that Jackson engaged in bribery and money laundering schemes prior to the time Robbins began to act as a government agent. (*See,* discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence *infra.*) More importantly, the jury actually convicted Jackson of bribery, mail fraud and money laundering offenses (the predicate offenses of Racketeering Acts 4 and 6) which occurred before Jackson came into contact with government agents. Because Jackson actually committed a similar bribery offense with the same parties before coming into contact with Robbins in his role as a government agent, there can be no question that Jackson was predisposed to offer a bribe as charged in Act 5 prior to his contact with government agents.

Jackson argues that because the offer of the $250,000 bribe dominated the trial, the instructional error on Act 5 tainted the other convictions. Under Jackson's view, the jurors based their findings that Jackson was guilty of the other, less dramatic and less substantiated offenses on their improper conclusion that Jackson offered a $250,000 bribe. However, there is no reason to believe that the jury improp-

erly bootstrapped up from its conclusion that Jackson committed Act 5 to its conclusion that Jackson committed the other charged crimes. If anything, the jury's not guilty verdicts on the first three charged racketeering acts demonstrate a careful and independent consideration of each offense. Although an improper entrapment instruction may so debase confidence in the judicial process as to constitute plain error in some cases, considering the strength of the government's evidence and the verdicts returned, it does not in this case.

D. *Rejection of Jackson's Proposed Instructions*

1. *Standards of Review*

[13] Whether a district court's rejection of a defendant's proposed jury instruction is reviewed *de novo* or for an abuse of discretion is undecided in the Ninth Circuit. *U.S. v. Zuniga*, 6 F.3d 569, 570 (9th Cir.1993). Because the district court's denial of Jackson's proposed instructions was proper even under the more stringent *de novo* standard, we do not resolve the issue here.

2. *The Instructions on Legal Activity Were Sufficient*

Jackson argues that by refusing several of his proposed instructions describing legal political activity, the district court failed to adequately distinguish bribery from legal activity. Jackson requested instructions stating the legality of lobbying, recommending campaign contributions to specific legislators, soliciting campaign contributions, and receiving political contributions outside the Capitol. The district court did tell the jury in Instruction No. 36, "Making contributions to political campaigns is considered in law to be a form of free speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Constitution of California." In Instruction No. 37, the district court defined a "lobbyist" for the jury as "an individual who, for

compensation, engages in direct communication with government officials . . . for the purpose of influencing legislative action." The district court properly rejected the rest of Jackson's proposed instructions describing legal activity as irrelevant to the issues in the case.

a. The Irrelevance of Jackson's Proposed Instructions

[14] The law is clear that "[a] trial judge may refuse an instruction if its language gives undue emphasis to defendant's version of the facts rather than being a statement of appropriate principles of [the] law for the jury to apply to the facts, or if it would tend to influence the jury toward accepting the defendant's version of the facts." *U.S. v. Goland*, 959 F.2d 1449, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 1992). In addition, the district court is not required to give an instruction on a point already adequately covered by another instruction. *U.S. v. Joelzki*, 952 F.2d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.1991).

[15] As the trial judge properly concluded, the issue is not whether the jury instructions describe what is indisputably legal behavior, but whether the jury instructions adequately define what is illegal behavior. As discussed above, the instructions defining the elements of bribery were adequate. The additional contrast to legal activity offered by Instruction Nos. 36 and 37 was more than adequate to distinguish legal political activity from the illegal conduct outlined by the other instructions. Inclusion of Jackson's other requested instructions on what was indisputably legal activity not in issue could only weight the instructions toward Jackson's theory that all his conduct was legal, and draw the jury's attention away from the real issue of whether the elements of bribery for the RICO count had been shown. Moreover, Jackson had ample opportunity to and did argue to the jury that his behavior was legal. Under a *de novo* or abuse of discretion standard, the district court did not err.

3. *Jackson's Proposed Theory of the Case Instructions Were Unnecessary*

Jackson argues that the district court erred by refusing his proposed jury instructions explaining his general theory of the case, that is, the Jackson "never intended to bribe Robbins but rather Jackson was extorted by Robbins and that Jackson was pretending to go along with a bribe scheme to notify and put off Robbins so as to avoid possible retaliation against Jackson's clients as well as Jackson personally." Jackson's Proposed Instruction Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 19 would have required the jury to acquit Jackson if they found Jackson lacked the intent to offer a bribe either because Robbins extorted or entrapped Jackson.

The district court rejected those proposed instructions, instructing the jury on extortion instead:

> The crime of bribery requires the specific intent to corruptly influence the legislator in his official capacity as to some act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceeding.
>
> Evidence, if any, that defendant Clayton Jackson was extorted by then Senator Robbins may be considered by you in determining whether or not the defendant Clayton Jackson acted with the specific intent to bribe Robbins during the time frame charged in said Racketeering Act Five.

The court instructed the jury on entrapment, in part, "A person is entrapped when a person has no previous intention to violate the law and is persuaded to commit a crime by government agents."

a. The Instruction Given Were Adequate

[16] "It is not reversible error to reject a defendant's proposed instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately cover that defense

theory." *U.S. v. Dees*, 34 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir.1994). The instructions given in this case adequately covered the law on both Jackson's entrapment and his extortion theories. The addition of Jackson's proposed instructions would have merely repeated the specifics of Jackson's theories which Jackson argued for hours in closing, running the risk of biasing the instructions in favor of one party. *U.S. v. Goland*, 959 F.2d at 1453-54.

[17] Moreover, where a defendant's theory turns on lack of intent, jury instructions that accurately reflect the intent required for the offense obviate the need for a specific instruction on innocent states of mind. *U.S. v. Dees*, 34 F.3d at 842. Because the several instructions given on the intent required to offer a bribe correctly stated the law, Jackson's proposed instructions explaining that no crime would be committed if he intended only to mollify Robbins were unnecessary.

The instructions fully and accurately explained the relevant legal standards and Jackson had a full opportunity to argue his case to the jury. The trial court properly rejected Jackson's proposed jury instructions on what is indisputably legal activity, as well as his redundant and argumentative theory of the case instructions.

E. *The Sufficiency of the Indictment*

Jackson argues that the indictment on Racketeering Acts 4 and 5 was insufficient because it failed to allege an explicitly quid pro quo.

[18, 19] This Court reviews the sufficiency of an indictment *de novo*. *U.S. v. Boone*, 951 F.2d 1526, 1542 (9th Cir.1991). An indictment is insufficient if it does not contain the necessary elements of the crime alleged. *Id.* An indictment that tracks the words of the statute violated is generally sufficient, but implied, necessary elements, not present in the statutory language, must be included in an indict-

ment. *U.S. v. Musacchio*, 968 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1991); *U.S. v. Morrison*, 536 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir.1976).

[20] As discussed above, Cal.Penal Code § 85 does not have an explicit quid pro quo element. The statutory language describes the sort of implicit quid pro quo that is the essence of bribery — the offer of something of value with the intent to influence corruptly. Because the statutory language, like the instructions given, adequately states the elements required, and the indictment here incorporates the relevant statutes, the indictment is sufficient.

F. *Sufficiency of the Evidence to Convict on Racketeering Act 5*

Jackson finally argues that the evidence of the bribe offer charged in Racketeering Act 5 was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The evidence consisted of tape recorded conversations between Jackson and Robbins. Sufficiency was for the jury to decide.

[21, 22] There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. *U.S. v. Reyes-Alvarado*, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 890, 113 S.Ct. 258, 121 L.Ed.2d 189 (1992).[6]

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[6]The government argues that because Jackson did not renew his motion for acquittal at the close of his case, the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewable only for plain error. However, the district court did not rule on Jackson's acquittal motion until after the jury returned its verdict. Jackson's assertion that the motion remained pending until the close of his case, obviating any need to reassert the same motion, seems

[23, 24] First, Jackson points to the fact that the $250,000 bribe was never given, suggesting that the money must have been delivered to sustain a conviction predicated on a § 85 violation. As the district court instructed the jury, however, whether a bribe was actually delivered is irrelevant to the issue of whether a bribe was offered in violation of § 85. *People v. Ah Fook*, 62 Cal. 493 (1881) (tender or production of bribe not required). There is no doubt a rational jury could have convicted Jackson on the evidence presented. The FBI caught Jackson on tape asking Robbins to bring workers' compensation legislation under the jurisdiction of Robbins' committee and then offering a "quarter" as payment for Robbins' help when Robbins asked for a "quantification" of the insurance companies' interest. Robbins explained in his testimony that the "quarter" Jackson offered was a $250,000 bribe that Robbins would receive in exchange for routing pending legislation to his friendly committee. Jackson himself admits that he understood Robbins to be discussing bribery. In short, the tape recordings of Jackson's dealings with Robbins create a record replete with unseemly discussions of a $250,000 payment in exchange for a political favor, of who will come up with that payment, and whether they will keep quiet. The recordings even include a remarkably frank recognition by Jackson of past crimes, of Jackson's and Robbins' shared understanding based on that illicit past, and their ongoing need to avoid federal investigation.

As Jackson argues, the jury could have concluded that Jackson lacked the intent to offer a bribe on this record. However, the jury was also free to take Jackson at his word on the taped conversations and reject Jackson's protestations that he had his fingers crossed when speaking on the tape and has only begun to tell the truth when defending himself

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correct. The issue was, therefore, adequately preserved and the above standard of review applies.

against criminal charges in court. Indeed, the district court found Jackson's in-court testimony incredible and increased his sentence on that basis.

III. OFFENSES RELATED TO MAIL FRAUD AND MONEY LAUNDERING

Jackson asserts that the prosecution pursued theories of mail fraud and money laundering outside those charged in the indictment, creating a host of instructional and evidentiary problems. In a nutshell, Jackson argues that on the money laundering counts, the indictment requires the prosecution to prove that Jackson knew that the donations he solicited were routed to Robbins through the Goddard Company, and that the money routed to Robbins was for Robbins' personal use. Regarding the mail fraud counts, Jackson contends that the prosecution had to prove that Jackson knew of the mailings charged in the indictment. Jackson asserts that the district court erred in 1) rejecting Jackson's proposed instructions that would have clarified these requirements; 2) failing to give unanimity instructions to ensure that all the jurors agreed to the same theory and particular act to convict Jackson; and 3) allowing the convictions to stand where the proof presented diverged from the acts charged in the indictment, rendering the evidence insufficient to sustain convictions on the charged offenses. In fact, the prosecution did not argue any theory outside the scope of the indictment, vitiating most of the instructional and evidentiary problems Jackson asserts. The few remaining shortcomings do not rise to the level of reversible error.

A. *Background: The Indictment*

In general, the indictment described the scheme through which Jackson would channel money from his insurance clients to Robbins. Jackson would solicit donations from his

insurance clients to Carpenter's campaign fund, deceiving his clients both as to the real beneficiary of their donations, and Carpenter's political status. (Jackson did not tell his clients that Carpenter was no longer in the Senate and currently served on the Board of Equalization where he would have little, if any, voice in insurance policy.) After taking his cut of the action, Carpenter would issue checks to Goddard Co. and report these campaign fund expenditures to the Secretary of State as public relations expenses. In fact, Goddard Co. performed no work for Carpenter, other than issuing phony invoices. Jennifer Goddard of Goddard Co. would then either pass the cash on to Robbins directly or spend the money as Robbins directed, after, of course, taking her cut.

Count I, the RICO count, Racketeering Act 6 charges Jackson with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1841 and 2, and money laundering or aiding and abetting money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i). Racketeering Act 6 charges six specific mailings, each a check payable to Carpenter from one of Jackson's insurance clients. Under the money laundering charge, the indictment alleges thirty acts, each a check payable to the Goddard Co. from Carpenter's account. Any single instance of mail fraud or money laundering alone could constitute Racketeering Act 6.

Count II charges Jackson and Carpenter with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and money laundering for their roles in the same scheme to pass donations from insurance companies through Carpenter and Goddard to Robbins as a bribe. This count lists Jackson's solicitations of various insurance companies to donate to Carpenter as Jackson's overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The indictment lists Carpenter's overt acts as the numerous checks written by Carpenter to the Goddard Co., along with Carpenter's campaign statements mailed to the Secretary of State which

mischaracterize these expenditures as payments for professional services.

Counts III through X charge Jackson with specific acts of mail fraud. Counts III and IV are based on the mailing of two checks from Jackson's insurance clients to Carpenter. (These checks are also listed as specific acts of mail fraud in Racketeering Act 6 of Count I.) Counts V through X are based on the Carpenter campaign reports mailed to the Secretary of State.

The jury convicted Jackson of Counts II through X, as well as Racketeering Act 6 of Count I, on both the mail fraud and money laundering prongs.

B. *Mail Fraud-Related Offenses*

1. *Claimed Instructional Errors*

The instructional errors on the mail fraud counts Jackson asserts are premised on the government arguing and presenting evidence on a theory of misrepresentation not charged in the indictment. Jackson contends the government improperly argued that Jackson fraudulently solicited donations to Carpenter from his clients by concealing or misrepresenting the fact that Carpenter was no longer a state senator.

Far from being a distinct scheme outside the ambit of the indictment, this fraud argued by the government was an integral part of the scheme charged in the indictment. As Robbins explained in his testimony, the prosecution argued to the jury, and the district court concluded, the fact that Carpenter was no longer in the senate where he would be voting on insurance matters allowed Carpenter to serve as a political heat shield for Robbins. Robbins understandably feared the political consequences of openly taking large sums from the powerful insurance interest. The parties believed Carpenter, who now served on the Board of Equalization, on the other hand, could accept the hefty donations

without drawing any scrutiny or sanction because he no longer was directly involved with insurance issues. In this way, Carpenter, an apparently disinterested third party, provided cover for the whole scheme. There can also be little doubt on the record here that if the insurance executives understood that Carpenter was not in the state senate or that their money would be passed on to Robbins, they would not have made the donations Jackson requested.

[25, 26] Furthermore, the indictment includes this defrauding of Jackson's clients as part of the overall scheme charged. With only slight variation, the indictment alleges in every count:

> *As part of the scheme to defraud and to obtain money by means of false pretenses, defendant CLAYTON R. JACKSON induced unsuspecting lobbying clients to make campaign contributions to Paul Carpenter's campaign committee,* when the defendant CLAYTON R. JACKSON then and there well knew that a substantial portion of the said contributions were not actually for the benefit of Paul Carpenter, but were in actuality to be routed through Paul Carpenter for the direct and indirect benefit of Alan E. Robbins.

(emphasis added). Jackson's argument that this language does not encompass Jackson's misrepresentation of Carpenter's political status to his clients when soliciting these donations simply slices the bologna too thin. Indictments should not be read so narrowly that they must explicitly include every particular argument or bit of evidence a prosecutor may offer at trial.

a. Unanimity Instructions Not Required

Jackson argues that because the prosecution presented two mail fraud schemes, the district court erred by not giving a unanimity instruction which would ensure that the jurors all agreed upon the same scheme. Jackson also argues

that a unanimity instruction was necessary to guarantee that all the jurors agreed upon the same mailing of the several mailings alleged in Racketeering Act 6. Because Jackson did not request a unanimity instruction at trial, the district court's instructions on this matter are reviewed for plain error.

[27, 28] Where the proof at trial shows more than one scheme, "the jury must be instructed that each of the jurors must find the defendant guilty of participation in the same single scheme to defraud and that the scheme ... is the same scheme as the overall fraudulent scheme in the indictment." *U.S. v. Mastelotto*, 717 F.2d 1238, 1247–48 (9th Cir.1983). Here, however, there was no need for a unanimity instruction. As discussed above, only one scheme, the scheme charged in the indictment, was presented to the jury. There can also be no doubt that all the jurors agreed to at least two of the mailings alleged in Racketeering Act 6. The mailings charged in Count III and IV are the same as those charged in Mailing Acts 5 and 6 in Racketeering Act 6. Because the jurors unanimously agreed upon the mailings in Count III and IV, convicting Jackson on those counts, the jurors necessarily unanimously agreed upon these same two mailings in Racketeering Act 6, removing any possible prejudice Jackson suffered due to the lack of a unanimity instruction. Also, conviction on any of the money laundering acts is also sufficient to convict on Racketeering Act 6, so if the money laundering conviction is proper, there would be no prejudice suffered from a bad instruction on mail fraud.

Finally, even if a unanimity instruction were required in either instance, it would not be plain error. *See, Griffin v. U.S.*, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991); *U.S. v. Castro*, 887 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1989).

b. Rejection of Jackson's Proposed Instruction

[29, 30] Jackson claims that the district court erred by rejecting his Proposed Instruction No. 23 that he argues "would have emphasized" the scheme charged in the indictment. Again, because the scheme argued was the scheme charged in the indictment, there was no need for a special instruction to distinguish schemes. Moreover, Jackson's proposed instruction is almost a verbatim recitation of the language in the indictment describing the scheme before every count. While it is true that a trial court's failure to orally instruct a jury on the elements of the charged offense cannot be cured by making a written indictment available to the jury, Jackson does not argue that the instructions did not adequately define the elements of the offense. Rather, Jackson can argue only that his redundant instruction would have offered emphasis of a particular theory. *Guam v. Marquez,* 963 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir.1992). This lack of emphasis does not render the instructions taken as a whole improper.

2. *Sufficiency of the Evidence to Convict on Mail Fraud Counts V Through X*

[31] Jackson argues that there is no evidence that he knew that Carpenter mailed campaign reports to the Secretary of State, the acts which form the basis of Count V through Count X. Although there is no direct evidence that Jackson knew of specific mailings, there is more than ample evidence from which a rational jury could infer Jackson's knowledge.

The whole aim of the arrangement was to get the bribe money to Robbins without having to report or otherwise expose the fact that Robbins was accepting substantial gifts from Jackson's insurance clients. In order for the scheme to work, Carpenter would have to falsify the campaign reports accounting for the money that was channelled to Robbins.

There was evidence that Jackson was fully informed on the scheme and aware of the laws requiring reporting of campaign fund expenditures. Jackson discussed the need to avoid these reporting rules with Robbins on numerous occasions. *See* discussion below regarding evidence that Jackson knew of the scheme. During one of the recorded conversations, Robbins and Jackson even discussed the benefits of finding a campaign committee through which to filter the bribe money, and both seemed to recognize with glee that they had used Carpenter and his campaign fund for this purpose in the past.

C. *The Money Laundering Offense*

Jackson argues that in order for the jury to convict him of the money laundering charges in Racketeering Act 6, the prosecution had to prove that Jackson knew of the Goddard Co.'s role in the scheme and also knew that the money transferred to Robbins was for Robbins' personal use. Because the instructions did not require the jury to find and the proof did not demonstrate that Jackson had this knowledge, Jackson argues, the jury could have improperly convicted Jackson based on the transfer of funds from his clients to Carpenter or on a legal intercandidate transfer of money from Carpenter's campaign fund to Robbins' campaign fund.

1. *Claimed Instructional Errors*

[32, 33] Jackson asserts that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction requiring the jury to find that Jackson knew the money funneled to Robbins was for Robbins' personal use. As the district court correctly concluded, the crime of money laundering, as charged, does not demand such a finding. The district judge properly instructed the jury that they must find that Jackson knew the money transferred "represented the proceeds of bribery and/or mail fraud" to convict him of money laundering. The

question then becomes whether the instructions regarding the underlying crimes of mail fraud and bribery were proper. The instructions were proper and neither crime requires a finding that Jackson knew Robbins put the proceeds to personal use.

Jackson also repeats the argument here that the trial court erred in rejecting his Proposed Instruction No. 23. Again, this instruction is redundant with the indictment and theories argued to the jury. The absence of this instruction, which merely stresses a charge in the in the indictment, cannot render the instructions taken as a whole inadequate.

Jackson also raises arguments for unanimity instructions on the money laundering charges that parallel his mail fraud contentions. As discussed in the mail fraud sections, the scheme the prosecution argued and proved was the same scheme outlined in the indictment. The transfer of funds from Jackson's unsuspecting clients to Carpenter was an integral part of the overall plan to launder Robbins' bribe. Because there was only one scheme argued and shown, no unanimity instruction was necessary to ensure that the jury all agreed upon the same scheme.

[34] Jackson's claim that a unanimity instruction to ensure that all the jurors agreed upon the same financial transaction among the thirty alleged in the indictment has more teeth, but does not depict a case of plain error.[7] The money laundering prong of Racketeering Act 6 charges Jackson with thirty separate acts of money laundering. To convict Jackson, all the jurors had to agree that Jackson was culpable for the same particular act, but the court did not give a unanimity instruction to this effect.

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[7] As with his mail fraud argument, Jackson did not request a unanimity instruction below, so this Court reviews the absence of a unanimity instruction for plain error only.

[35] However, any harm resulting from this error could not so undermine confidence in the jury's verdict to constitute plain error. Each of the thirty specific transactions charged in Racketeering Act 6 is a check paid by Carpenter to the Goddard Co. Though many separate checks are listed, they all document the same part of the money laundering scheme. Therefore, as the government argues, if Jackson is culpable for one check, he would be culpable for all of them. Jackson may be correct that there should have been a unanimity instruction here, but its absence does not constitute reversible error.

2. *Sufficiency of the Evidence on Money Laundering*

[36] Jackson recasts the argued instructional errors as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with the same results. He makes the baseless assertion that there is no evidence that he knew of the Goddard Company's role in the scheme. First, it is not necessary that the evidence establish that Jackson actually knew of Goddard Co. The evidence need only show that Jackson initiated, concluded, or participated in the initiation or conclusion of the transaction to support a conviction on the substantive offense. *U.S. v. Castaneda*, 16 F.3d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir.1994). Even if Jackson did not know the specific identity of the middle man between Carpenter and Robbins, the evidence is clear that he was instrumental in arranging the transaction. At a minimum, Jackson initiated the transaction by fraudulently soliciting donations from his clients to Carpenter. *See, U.S. v. Manarite*, 44 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1995), *as amended* (March 15, 1995) (discussing generally the elements and evidence required to substantiate a money laundering offense).

[37] The evidence can be even weaker to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting money laundering, which the indictment also charges in Racketeering Act 6. To convict Jackson on the aiding and abetting charge the jury

needed to find only that "(a) the crime was committed, (b) the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured another person to commit the crime, and (c) the defendant acted before the crime was completed." *Id.* It is not necessary for an aider and abetter to know who actually committed the crime. *Id.* at 1512. The entire course of the recorded conversations between Robbins and Jackson evidence Jackson's role as instigator of the deal and advisor to Robbins on how to conduct the deal, establishing aiding and abetting liability even absent any evidence that Jackson knew of Goddard Co.

Furthermore, although there is no direct evidence Jackson knew of Goddard Co. by name, there is plenty of evidence from which a rational jury could infer that Jackson was well aware of Goddard Co. Robbins testified that Carpenter said he would work out the details of the laundering scheme with Jackson. Robbins further testified that shortly thereafter both Jackson and Carpenter confirmed that they had met and worked out the details.

IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL NOT RAISED AT TRIAL

Jackson's amicus briefs have raised a number of interesting abstract questions, but as they were not presented to the trial court, we have no occasion to speculate about them in deciding whether there was reversible error in this case.

V. CONCLUSION

Jackson was caught on tape engaged in behavior so antithetical to and destructive of our political traditions that there can be no serious argument that Jackson is an innocent man convicted by a jury whose real problem was prejudice against the democratic process. Jackson's bribery, money laundering, and mail fraud schemes provide such a clear and extreme case of corruption that there is no danger

that legitimate lobbyists could confuse First Amendment political expression with the type of behavior for which Jackson was convicted. Jackson's convictions in no way undercut our nation's commitment to the First Amendment freedoms to lobby and make donations to political causes. The verdict casts no aspersion on the legitimate role professional lobbyists may play in facilitating the exercise of political freedom. If Jackson's convictions, based as they are on the overwhelming evidence amassed by the state and the well-articulated laws of California, chills any activity, they can only chill behavior that is plainly corrupt and plainly proscribed by law.

Because there is no requirement of an explicit quid pro quo under Cal.Penal Code § 85, there was no error in the instructions or evidence on the bribery-related charges. Because the prosecution argued and proved only one money laundering and mail fraud scheme, the scheme charged in the indictment, the instructions were proper and the evidence sufficient on the mail fraud and money laundering charges. Any other shortcomings in the evidence of instructions did not rise to the level of reversible error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.